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KYLES V. WHITLEY: DEATH OR
DECLARATION?
Kyles v. Whifley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kyles v. Whitley,1 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether police misconduct resulted in an innocent man's con-
viction and death sentence. Kyles claimed that, contrary to the
findings of lower courts, the prosecution withheld evidence "material"
to his defense in contradiction to United States v. Brady and United
States v. Bagley.3 The Supreme Court found that the Fifth Circuit mis-
takenly applied the Brady "materiality" standard and that there was a
"reasonable probability" that the evidence withheld from Kyles would
have undermined the jury's verdict.4 Thus, the Court granted a new
trial to reconsider the defendant's conviction and death sentence. 5
This Note argues that the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari
to review the Fifth Circuit's application of the "materiality" standard as
it claimed, but to consider whether the lower court had sentenced an
innocent man to death. By using an illusory "legal error" to justify
certiorari rather than the Court's true concerns over imposition of the
death penalty, the Court has confused the "materiality" standard for
future courts.
This Note further argues thatJustice Scalia and the dissent incor-
rectly asserted that the Court was barred from granting certiorari by
the "two court rule" and 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Moreover, by arguing the
"two court rule" and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 apply to "materiality" determi-
nations, the dissent exacerbated a circuit court split over the proper
standard of review.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE COURT'S INSTITUTIONAL ROLE IN GRANTING CERTIORARI
The Supreme Court obtains its power to decide cases from Article
1 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995).
2 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
4 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1569.
5 Id. at 1560.
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III of the United States Constitution.6 Article III of the Constitution
grants the Court authority to decide all cases or controversies within
its jurisdiction. 7 However, the Court's most important role in the
American judiciary is to consider cases whose resolution can be ex-
pected to provide useful guidance to lower courts confronted with
similar legal issues.8 Under this institutional role, the Court generally
does not grant certiorari to review a case if it would have no legal
significance apart from the settlement of the case or controversy.9
Furthermore, the Court must, to stay within this institutional role,
grant certiorari to decide only one or two narrow issues presented by
the parties in dispute. 10
A departure from this institutional role is normally considered
inappropriate for the Supreme Court because it requires the Court to
function as a court of errors and appeals. 1' A court of errors and
appeals searches the record of every case that comes before it for legal
or factual errors.' 2 Its primary goal in searching each case for errors is
to do justice in that particular case.' 3 Generally, the errors and ap-
peals model is thought to be inappropriate for the Supreme Court
because it runs counter to traditional conceptions of the Supreme
Court's role, it is a practical impossibility, and it does not efficiently or
effectively prevent unjust executions.' 4
Statutes and case law ensure that the Supreme Court comports
with its customary institutional role. Two examples of such law are 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) and the "two court rule."15 Section 2254(d) requires
6 Article III, Sec. 2 cl. 1 of the United States Constitution states that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies
to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States; between citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
7 Id.
8 Derick P. Beralge, Note, Pleas of the Condemned: Should Certiorari Petitions from Death
Row Receive Enhanced Access to the Supreme Court?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1120 (1984) [hereinafter
Condemned]. Cf. Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme
Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. Ruv. 681, 715 (1984).
9 United States v.Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925) ("We do not grant a certiorari to
review evidence and discuss specific facts.").
10 Sup. CT. R. § 14.1(a) ("Only the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included
therein, will be considered by the Court.").
11 Condemned, supra note 8, at 1120.
12 Id. at 1134.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1135.
15 Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1577 (1995) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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reviewing courts to defer to lower court findings of fact in habeas
corpus' 6 proceedings.' 7 Under the statute, reviewing courts can only
grant certiorari if one of eight statutory exceptions is established by
the courts18 or if the review is not of a finding of fact, but a mixed
issue of law and fact or an issue simply of law.' 9 Similarly, the "two
court rule" prevents the court from reviewing factual findings by lower
courts ° when two lower courts come to the same conclusion upon
16 For a general discussion of habeas corpus, see Amos E. Hartston & Jay Gonzalez,
Habeas Relieffor State Prisoners, 83 GEo. LJ. 1392 (1995).
Habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy available to a state prisoner who chal-
lenges the fact or duration of her confinement and seeks as relief her speedier or
immediate release. The Supreme Court has characterized the writ as a "remedy avail-
able to effect discharge from any confinement contrary to the Constitution or funda-
mental law, even though imposed pursuant to conviction by a court of competent
jurisdiction." Id. (citation omitted)
17 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994). Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determina-
tion after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of compe-
tent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or
an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opin-
ion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be
correcL ...
18 Id.; Burden v. Zant, 498 U.S. 433, 437 (1991) ("A habeas court may not disregard
[the § 2254] presumption (of correctness] unless it expressly finds that one of the enumer-
ated exceptions to § 2254(d) is met, and it explains the reasoning in support of that con-
clusion."). The eight exceptions are: (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not
resolved by state hearing; (2) the state court's fact finding procedure was not adequate to
provide a full and fair hearing; (3) the material facts were not adequately developed at the
state hearing-, (4) the state court lacked jurisdiction over either the subject matter or the
petitioner;, (5) counsel was not appointed for an indigent petitioner; (6) the petitioner did
not receive a full and fair hearing-, (7) the petitioner was otherwise denied due process of
law; or (8) the petitioner produced the state record and the federal court concludes that
the evidence is insufficient to fairly support the state court's determination. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d).
19 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1980); See also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,
110-16 (1985) (holding voluntariness of confession is a question of law subject to in-
dependent federal habeas review); Ouimette v. Moran, 942 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1991)
(holding materiality of facts withheld by prosecution during state trial is mixed question of
law and fact subject to independent federal habeas review).
20 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271 (1949), contains a
classic statement of the two-court rule. The Court affirmed a district court ruling, affirmed
by the court of appeals, that various patent claims were valid. Justice Jackson began by
quoting Civil Rule 52, and finding that its clearly erroneous test was applicable in cases
turning on expert testimony. Id. at 274. He then justified a particularly narrow scope of
review by the Supreme Court in terms of the Court's own institutional role: "A court of
law, such as this Court is, rather than a court for correction of errors in fact finding, cannot
undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by two courts below in absence of a very
obvious and exceptional showing of error." Id at 275. See also Goodman v. Lukens Steel
Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665 (1987) ("[B]oth courts below having agreed on the facts, we are not
inclined to examine the record for ourselves absent some extraordinary reason for under-
taking this task."); National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 98 n.15 (1984) ("In accord with our usual practice, we must now accord great
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making a finding of fact.2 1 However, the purpose is again the same-
to keep the Supreme Court involved in resolving confusing legal is-
sues rather than individual claims of injustice.
22
B. THE BRADY RULE
In the United States, the Constitution ensures a criminal defend-
ant's right to a fair trial 23 The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments "require . . . that [government] action,
whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent with the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions and not infrequently are desig-
nated as 'law of the land.' "24 A prosecutor can violate the Due Process
Clause by suppressing exculpatory or impeaching evidence that is ma-
terial to his guilt or punishment.25 When a prosecutor fails to disclose
evidence, the United States Supreme Court relies on Brady v. Mary-
weight to a finding of fact which has been made by a district court approved by a court of
appeals.")
21 Graver Tank, 336 U.S. at 275.
22 Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1577 (1995) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
23 The criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is mandated by the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"[C]onstruction of [the Due Process] Clause will apply equally to the comparable clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to trials in state courts." United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
24 Nicholas A. Lambros, Note, Conviction and Imprisonment Despite Nondisclosure of Evi-
dence Favorable to the Accused By the Prosecution: Standard of Materiality Reconsidered, 19 NEw
ENG.J. ON CRIM. & CiV. CONFINEMENT 103 (1993) [hereinafter Conviction and Imprisonment]
(quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1926)). See also Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819) in which the Supreme Court stated:
By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law; a law, which hears
before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after
trial. The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immu-
nities, under protection of the general rules which govern society.
Id. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a GrandJury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wimess against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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land26 and its progeny to determine whether a defendant's due pro-
cess rights are compromised.
1. Historical Predecessors to the Brady Rule
As the Court noted in Kyles v. Whitley, "[t] he prosecution's affirm-
ative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant can trace its
origins to early 20th-century strictures against misrepresentation
... ."27 In 1935, the Supreme Court began addressing misconduct in
cases where prosecutors knowingly used perjured testimony to convict
criminal defendants.28 In Mooney v. Holohan,29 a labor leader was con-
victed of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.30
The defendant applied for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the
prosecutor obtained the conviction by using false testimony.3' After
being denied a writ of habeas corpus by the District Court of Califor-
nia and the Ninth Circuit, the defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court.3 2 The defendant's request was denied because he had not ex-
hausted his remedies in state court;33 however, in dicta the Court
found the knowing use of false testimony by the prosecutor amounted
to a violation of due process.3 4
In 1942, the Supreme Court, in Pyle v. Kansas,35 reaffirmed the
principle set forth in Mooney. In Pyle, the defendant was convicted of
murder and robbery.36 Subsequently, he was sentenced to a life term
for the murder and ten to twenty years for the robbery conviction.
37
After his application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the
Supreme Court of Kansas, Pyle sought review by the United States
26 Id.
27 Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1565 (1995).
28 Conviction and Imprisonment, supra note 24, at 106. See also Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam).
29 Mooney, 294 U.S. at 103.
30 Id. at 109.
3' Id. at 110.
32 Id. at 109.
33 Id. at 115.
34 Id. at 112. The Court stated:
[Due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice
and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which
in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through deception
of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a
contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is
as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands ofjustice as is the obtaining of a like
result by intimidation.
Id.
35 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
36 Id. at 213-14.
37 Id. at 214.
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Supreme Court.38 The defendant alleged that he was convicted be-
cause the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony and deliber-
ately did not disclose favorable evidence. 39 The defendant argued
that the nondisclosure of evidence violated his constitutional right to
a fair trial.4° The Supreme Court found that "[t]hese allegations [of
using false testimony and suppressing favorable evidence] sufficiently
charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution,
and, if proven, would entitle petitioner to be released from his pres-
ent custody."4 1 As a result, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the state court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus and affirmed
Mooney's prohibition against a prosecutor's knowing use of false testi-
mony and suppression of evidence favorable to the accused. 42
Thus, Mooney and Pyle established a constitutional rule barring
the prosecution from using perjured testimony. More importantly,
Mooney and Pyle laid the foundation that would eventually become the
principle espoused in Brady v. Maryland a prosecutor's suppression of
favorable evidence violates due process where the evidence is material
to guilt or innocence.
43
2. The Creation of the Brady Rule
The United States Supreme Court decided Brady v. Maryland in
1963.44 Brady was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
death.45 Although Brady admitted at trial to having a role in the
crime, he claimed that a companion committed the actual murder.4 6
Upon a request to examine the extrajudicial statements of Brady's
companion, the prosecution released several of the companion's
statements. 4 7 However, the prosecution withheld the companion's
statement in which he admitted that he had killed the murder vic-
tim.48 This admission was disclosed only after Brady had been tried,
convicted, and sentenced.49 Brady's request for post-conviction relief
was denied by the trial court; however, the Maryland Court of Appeals
remanded the case for retrial on the issue of punishment, but not
38 Id. at 215.
39 Id. at 214.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 215-16 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)).
42 Id. at 216.
43 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
44 Id.




49 Id. at 85.
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guilt.50 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
holding that the newly discovered evidence was only "material" to
punishment and that retrial on this issue alone did not violate the
accused's right to due process. 51
Brady v. Maryland was a landmark decision because, for the first
time, the United States Supreme Court announced that a prosecutor
had an affirmative constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence
upon request of the defense.52 The Brady rule dictates "that the sup-
pression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution."53
While Brady demanded prosecutors to disclose evidence when
"material," the Court never defined "materiality."54 The subsequent
Brady cases heard by the Supreme Court developed a definition of
materiality "by which a prosecutor could gauge his disclosure
responsibilities."55
3. Brady Today-The Development of Materiality
a. United States v. Agurs
In United States v. Agurs,56 the issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the Brady rule should be expanded to include cases in which
the defense did not make a specific request for evidence and to cases
in which the prosecution did not use perjured evidence. 57 In Agurs,
the defendant was convicted of second degree murder.58 After trial
the defendant claimed that the prosecutor did not disclose informa-
tion regarding the victim's background that would have bolstered the
defendant's self-defense argument.59 According to the defendant, the
prosecution's suppression of the evidence resulted in an unfair trial.
60
50 Id.
51 Id. at 88-91. See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) for a discussion
of the Brady decision.
52 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
53 Id.
54 Comment, Materiality and Defense Requests: Aids in Defining the Prosecutor's Duty of Disclo-
sure, 59 IOWA L. REv. 433, 436-37 (1973).
55 Id. at 438; See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
56 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
57 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107. The Court had to decide whether a prosecutor was constitu-
tionally obligated to disclose exculpatory evidence when there was only a general request
or no request at all. Id.
58 Id. at 98.




The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claims. 61
In rejecting the defendant's claims, the Court identified three sit-
uations in which a Brady claim might arise.62 First, the Court identi-
fied situations where previously undisclosed evidence revealed that
the prosecution introduced trial testimony it knew or should have
known was perjured. 63 In this situation, the Court held that perjured
testimony is "material" and a conviction must be vitiated if "there is
any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury."6 4
Second, the Court addressed the situation where the government
failed to accede to a defense request for disclosure of specific exculpa-
tory evidence. 65 While the Court did not define a particular standard
of materiality for these situations, it indicated that the standard might
be pro-defense subject to harmless-error review.66
Third, the Court highlighted the situation where the government
failed to volunteer exculpatory evidence never requested, or re-
quested only in a general way.67 In this situation, the Court held that
reversal was only warranted where the undisclosed evidence would
create a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.68
In sum, the Court found a duty on the part of the government to
disclose evidence even when the defendant does not request evidence
that may be favorable to him.69 However, the Government need only
disclose the information when it would be "of sufficient significance to
result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial."70
b. United States v. Bagley-Today's Standard for Materiality
The standards of materiality prescribed for the three situations
enunciated in Agurs were modified significantly in United States v. Bag-
ey.71 In Bagley, the defendant was convicted of violating a federal nar-
cotics statute. 72 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
61 Id. at 114.
62 Id. at 103.
63 Id. at 103-04.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 104.
66 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681 (1984); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.
67 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106.
68 Id. at 112.
69 Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1565 (1995).
70 Id. "For unless the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no
constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; and absent a constitutional
violation, there was no breach of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose." Agurs,
427 U.S. at 108.
71 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
72 Id. at 671.
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the proper standard of materiality to be applied in a reviewing court's
analysis of whether a conviction should be overturned due to the pros-
ecutor's failure to disclose impeachment evidence upon request.73
The Supreme Court, in its holding, disavowed any difference between
exculpatory and impeaching evidence for Brady purposes, and it aban-
doned the distinction between the second, and third Agurs circum-
stances-the "specific or general request" and the "no request"
situations. 74
Furthermore, the Court set forth the definition of materiality
used today. The new standard of materiality was a result of the appli-
cation formulated in Strickland v. Washington75 to resolve ineffective-
ness of counsel claims. 76 The new rule stated that "evidence is
material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evi-
dence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.77 A "'reasonable probability' is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
78
Thus, the Court created a new rule for materiality that applied to all
instances of nondisclosure while maintaining the lowest standard of
materiality for the knowing use of perjured testimony.
79
C. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR BRADY "MATERIALITY"
DETERMINATIONS
Normally, the review of lower court decisions is conducted under
one of two standards. First, if the lower court decision is a finding of
fact, the reviewing court evaluates the decision under a "clearly erro-
neous" standard of review.80 Under a "clearly erroneous" standard of
review, the reviewing court cannot reverse a finding of fact simply be-
cause the court is convinced that it would have decided the case differ-
ently.81 Rather, when the lower court decision is a finding of fact, the
reviewing court must defer to the lower court decision unless it is
"clearly erroneous." 82
Second, when there is a question of law or a mixed question of
73 Id. at 669.
74 Id. at 676, 682; See also Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. at 1565.
75 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
76 Conviction and Imprisonment, supra note 24, at 124.
77 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (1984).
78 Id.
79 Bag/ey, 473 U.S. at 678.
80 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1995) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documen-
tary evidence, shall not be set aside~unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the wimesses...
81 Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). ,
82 Id. See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).
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law and fact, the reviewing court normally considers the case de novo.
Under de novo review, the Court does not have to defer to the lower
court opinion because, theoretically, it has granted certiorari to clarify
the use of a particular legal standard rather than to reevaluate the
facts of a case.83
Currently, the circuit courts are split over the proper standard of
review to apply in "materiality" determinations under Bagley. While a
minority of the courts defer to lower court opinions as if the determi-
nation is a finding of fact,84 the majority of courts perceive the "mate-
riality" determination as a mixed question of law and fact that requires
de novo review.85 Supreme Court precedent supports a d novo review
of "materiality" when a habeas petition alleges a violation of the Brady
doctrine. In Strickland v. Washington, the Court created the "reason-
able probability" standard, later used to define materiality, and deter-
mined the standard was a mixed question of law and fact.86 Because
Bagley borrowed the standard from Strickland to define "materiality,"
most circuit courts have found that application of the materiality stan-
dard should also be a mixed question of law and fact requiring de novo
review. 87
More generally, the Court has, in evaluating petitions for habeas
corpus relief, refused to equate findings of fact with mixed questions
of law and fact when applying standards of review.88 While pure find-
ings of fact in habeas petitions are normally accorded a "clearly erro-
neous" standard of review, mixed questions of fact and law have
traditionally been adjudicated under a de novo stndard.89
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. THE CRIME
At approximately 2:20 p.m. on September 20, 1984, Mrs. Dolores
Dye, a sixty year old woman, was murdered in the parking lot at the
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Price, 13 F.3d 711, 722 (3d Cir. 1994).
85 See, e.g., United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1209 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995); Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1516 (10th
Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 433, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1994); Cornell v. Nix, 976 F.2d
376, 382 (8th Cir. 1992).
86 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 682 (1985) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
87 Wdson, 28 F.3d at 437 n.6.
88 Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982).
89 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 642 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring); Wright v.
West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-304 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Schwegmann Brother's grocery store in New Orleans.90 As Dye was
putting her grocery bags into the trunk of her red Ford LTD, a man
accosted her.91 After a short struggle, the man drew a revolver, fired
into.Dye's left temple, and killed her.92 The gunman took Dye's keys
and drove away in the LTD.
9 3
B. THE INVESTIGATION
On the day of the murder, New Orleans police took statements
from several eyewitnesses, who offered descriptions of the gunman.
94
Police spoke to Isaac Smallwood, Henry Williams, and three other wit-
nesses at the scene.95 Isaac Smallwood was working at a street corner
by the Schwegmann Brother's parking lot.96 The gunman drove past
Smallwood in the LTD, allowing Smallwood to see the gunman's
face.97 Williams was also working nearby the parking lot.9 8 Williams
witnessed the struggle and murder and saw the gunman's face as the
gunman slowly passed within twelve feet of him.99
Later that day the police discovered two additional eyewitnesses,
Robert Territo and Darlene Cahill, who had left the crime scene, but
called the station to report the murder. 00 Territo witnessed the
shooting and saw the gunman's face at close range when the mur-
derer stopped for a traffic light next to the truck Territo was driv-
ing.' 0 ' Cahill witnessed the murder from approximately 100 feet away
while riding in a vehicle on an adjacent highway.
0 2
All of the witnesses agreed that the gunman was a black man, who
wore a dark colored shirt, blue-jeans, and his hair in "plaits."'0 3 How-
ever, the witnesses differed in their descriptions of height, age, weight,
build and hair length. 0 4 Two witnesses reported seeing a man of sev-
enteen or eighteen, while another described the gunman as approxi-
mately twenty-eight years old.'0 5 One witness described the gunman's













102 Brief for Respondent at 3, Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995) (No. 93-7927).
103 Kyles, 5 F.3d at 808.




5'4" or 5'5", medium build, 140-150 pounds; another witness de-
scribed him as thin and close to six feet.10 6 One witness said he had a
mustache; none of the others mentioned any facial hair. 10 7 Finally,
one witness said the murderer had shoulder length hair; another wit-
ness said the murderer had short hair.
108
Based on the eyewitness testimony, the police believed the killer
might have driven his own car to Schwegmann's and left it there when
he drove off in Dye's LTD.' 0 9 As a result, the police recorded the
license numbers of the cars remaining in the parking lot near the
store on the evening of the murder.110 The police did not take down
the license numbers of every car in the parking lot."'
Despite the eyewitness accounts and the recorded license num-
bers, the police were without leads until Saturday evening, September
22, 1984, when a man identifying himself as James "Beanie" Joseph"
12
called police to report that a man named "Curtis""8 had sold him a
red Ford LTD on Thursday, September 20, 1984.114 During the
phone call, Beanie told the police that he had read about Dye's mur-
der in the newspaper and feared that the LTD he purchased was the
victim's.1
5
A police detective subsequently met with Beanie at 10:00 p.m.
that Saturday evening. 116 During this meeting Beanie told the police
that he bought the car on Friday, September 21, 1984, rather than
Thursday as he had suggested earlier on the phone. 1 7 Beanie led the
police to the LTD he bought from Kyles, later identified as Dye's." 8
After showing the police the location of the car, Beanie told them he
had changed the plates on the car, and that he was worried about
being charged for the murder on the basis of his possession of the
LTD." 9 The police assured him not to worry. 120
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1560-61.
108 Id. at 1561.
109 Id.
110 Id.
"II Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 816 (5th Cir. 1993).
112 The informant used several aliases throughout his cooperation with the police in-
cludingJoseph Wallace (his actual name),Joseph Banks, andJamesJoseph. Kyl, 115 S.
CL at 1561. Both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court referred to Wallace as "Beanie,"
so that is the name that is used in the Note.
113 Id. at 1561. "Curtis" was later identified as Curtis Kyles, the petitioner. Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Brief for Respondent at 3, Kyle (No. 93-7927). See also Kyles, 115 S. CL at 1561. The






During the conversation, Beanie explained that he lived with
Kyles' brother-in-law, Johnny Burns.' 2 ' Beanie described Kyles as a
slim, six foot tall, twenty-four or twenty-five year old with a "bush hair-
style."' 2 2 When questioned whether Kyles ever wore his hair in
"plaits," Beanie responded yes, but that he "had a bush" when Beanie
bought the car.12 3 Beanie also instructed the police that Kyles regu-
larly carried two pistols, a .38 caliber and a .32 caliber.'2 4 Beanie told
police that if the police could "set him up good," he would get them
the gun used to kill Dye. 125
Beanie then showed the detectives the location of Kyles' apart-
ment and told them what happened after he bought the car from
Kyles. 126 After buying the car from Kyles, Beanie and Johnny Burns
drove Kyles to Schwegmann's at about 9 p.m. on Friday evening to
pick up Kyles' car, an orange four-door Ford. 27 Beanie instructed the
police that Kyles' car was located on the same side of the parking lot
as the murder scene.' 28 Beanie later showed them the exact spot' 2 9
Beanie also told the police that Kyles removed the grocery sacks from
the LTD and put Dye's stolen purse in the garbage outside his apart-
ment on the following day.' 30
After the visit to Schwegmann's, the detective took Beanie to the
police station where the detectives conducted an extensive interview
with Beanie on the record which was later transcribed and signed by
Beanie.13' During the interview, Beanie repeated substantially what
he had earlier reported to the detectives.' 32 However, some portions
of Beanie's statements contradicted his earlier story.' 3 3
Based on the information provided by Beanie, the police re-
trieved garbage from the front of Kyles' residence. 34 Inside one of
the garbage bags, the police found Dye's purse, identification and








127 Id. According to testimony and photographs introduced at trial, Kyles' car was really
a two-door Mercury. Id.





133 Id. For example, Beanie indicated that he had learned of the robbery from his





On Monday, September 24, 1984, the police arrested Kyles and
searched his apartment under warrant.1 6 The police seized eight
Schwegmann's grocery bags, a .32 caliber revolver with one spent
round from behind Kyles' stove,' 3 7 a homemade holster, a box of .82
caliber ammunition, and a Schwegmann's bag filled with a large
amount of dog and cat food similar to that purchased by the victim.
1 8
No identifiable fingerprints could be obtained from the evidence
seized at Kyles' apartment; however, Kyles' fingerprints were on a
Schwegmann's receipt found in the LTD.'3 9 The receipt's contents
were illegible due to the chemicals applied by police to identify
fingerprints.
140
After Kyles was arrested, a detective prepared a photo lineup for
five eyewitnesses. 141 Three of the witnesses picked Kyles immediately,
another picked him tentatively.
142
C. THE TRIALS
Kyles was subsequently indicted for first degree murder. 143
Before Kyles' trial the defense filed a motion for disclosure by the
State of any exculpatory evidence. 4 4 The prosecution responded that
there was "no exculpatory evidence of any nature,"' 45 despite the pros-
ecutor's knowledge of Beanie's statements, contemporaneous eyewit-
ness statements, and the computer print-out of license plate numbers
recorded after the murder.14
6
At Kyles' first trial, in November, 1984, the State relied on the
testimony of four eyewitnesses that were at the crime scene. 147 The
defense argued that Kyles had been set up by Beanie, who had
planted evidence in Kyles' apartment and garbage in order to shift
suspicion away from himself, remove an impediment to his romance
with Pinky Burns, 148 and to collect reward money.149 Beanie, how-
135 Id. at 1563.
136 Id. at 1562.
137 The .32 caliber gun was later identified as the murder weapon. Id.
138 Id.









148 Id. Pinky Burns was Kyles' common law wife. Id. at 1562 n.4
149 Id. at 1563. Beanie was awarded $1,600.00 as a reward. Id. at 1564.
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ever, did not testify.15° The jury was deadlocked, and the court de-
clared a mistrial.15 1
After the mistrial, the chief trial prosecutor, Cliff Strider, inter-
viewed Beanie. 152 Beanie again changed important parts of his story;
"not withstanding the many inconsistencies among Beanie's state-
ments, neither Strider's notes nor any other notes or transcripts were
given to the defense."
153
In December, 1984, Kyles was tried a second time. 54 The State,
again, relied primarily on the testimony of the four eyewitnesses to
establish Kyles as the gunman. 155 In addition, the State offered a
blown-up photograph of what was alleged to be Kyles' car parked in
the Schwegmann's lot at the time of the murder.156 The defense,
again, argued that the perpetrator was Beanie, not Kyles. 157 In sup-
port of this assertion, defense witnesses, who were friends and relatives
of Kyles, testified that Beanie was seen driving Dye's LTD on Thurs-
day, September 20; that Beanie changed the license plates on the car,
and offered to sell the car on Friday, September 21 for $300.00; and
that Beanie was seen looking behind Kyles' kitchen stove, where the
gun was later found, on Sunday, September 23.158 Kyles took the
stand and explained that the receipt with his fingerprints on it had
fallen out of a bag during a ride in the LTD when he removed ciga-
rettes he had purchased from the bag.159 In rebuttal, the prosecution
brought in Beanie to stand next to Kyles so that each witness could
identify the murderer. 160 Each witness identified Kyles as the killer.161
Beanie again did not testify.162 The jury returned a verdict of guilty of
first degree murder and a sentence of death. 165 The conviction and
sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. 1
64
On collateral review, it was revealed that the State had failed to
150 Id
151 Id. at 1563.
152 Id
153 Id. at 1563-64. Strider's notes indicated that Beanie went with Kyles to retrieve Kyles'
car from the Schwegmann's lot on Thursday, not Friday as he had earlier claimed. Id. at
1563. Also, Beanie told Strider that when he picked up the car he was not only accompa-
nied by Bums, but also Kevin Black. ld.




158 Kyles, 5 F.Sd at 809-10.





164 State v. Kyles, 513 So. 2d 265 (La. 1987), cet. denied, 486 U.S. 1027 (1988).
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disclose evidence favorable to the defense. 165 Documents withheld
from the defense included contemporaneous statements that Williams
and Smallwood gave to police right after the murder; a tape recording
of the conversation between Beanie and police detectives that oc-
curred on Saturday, September 22, 1984; Beanie's typed and signed
statement; Cliff Strider's handwritten notes from his interview with
Beanie after the first trial; and a computer print-out of license plate
numbers recorded in the parking lot after the murders. 166 Despite
the discovery of the new evidence, the State trial court denied relief,
and the State Supreme Court denied Kyles' application for discretion-
ary review.
167
Kyles, having exhausted his state remedies, filed a habeas corpus
petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana. 168 He raised twenty potential violations of his rights. 169
Most relevant among these was the question of whether the evidence
withheld from him by the police was material and whether his convic-
tion was obtained in violation of his due process rights under Brady v.
Maryland.170
Citing Brady, the District Court held that even if the police had
disclosed the evidence, there was not a "reasonable probability" that
the result of the trial would have been different.171 Therefore, the
court found the evidence immaterial and no due process violation. 172
After addressing the other alleged violations, the court denied Kyles'
petition. 17
Subsequently, Kyles appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. 174 In a divided vote, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Dis-
trict Court's decision. 175 Kyles again argued, among other things, that
the State's failure to disclose information was a Brady violation.
176
Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence
165 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1564.
166 Id. at 1563.
167 State ex rel. Kyles v. Butler, 566 So. 2d 386 (La. 1990).
168 Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 844 (1993).
169 Kyles, 5 F.3d at 847 (1993).
170 Id. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A Brady violation occurs when the prose-
cution withholds evidence that is material and favorable to the defendant. Evidence is
material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." See id. at 682. A reason-
able probability is shown when the nondisclosure of evidence "undermines the confidence
in the outcome of the trial." Id.
171 Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 848 (1993).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 861.
174 Id. at 862.
175 Id at 806.
176 Id. at 810.
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was immaterial because there was not a "reasonable probability" that
the evidence would have undermined the outcome of the trial.'77
The court concluded that regardless of the undisclosed evidence,
Kyles faced "overwhelming evidence of guilt." 78 Therefore, the court
found that neither a Brady nor a due process violation occurred.' 9
Kyles' arguments did find favor, however, in Judge King's dis-
sent. 80 Judge King stated that "[f]or the first time in my fourteen
years on this court.., during which I have participated in the deci-
sions of literally dozens of capital habeas cases... I have serious reser-
vations about whether the State sentenced to death the wrong
man."18' Unlike the majority, Judge King believed the undisclosed
police evidence would have undermined the jury verdict.'8 2 He based
this decision on several factors. First, Judge King did not believe the
evidence against Kyles was as strong as the majority suggested because
Kyles' original jury, hearing evidence essentially identical to that of-
fered in the second trial, was deadlocked on the question of guilt.183
Second, Judge King thought that the undisclosed conversations with
Beanie revealed various inconsistencies that would strengthen Kyles'
defense that Beanie framed him.184 Third, Judge King purported that
the undisclosed contemporaneous witness statements undermined
witness testimony at the trial.'8 5 Finally, Judge King asserted that the
undisclosed print-out of license numbers, which did not include
Kyles' car, would have undercut the picture prosecutors used to prove
Kyles was in the parking lot at the time of the murder. 8 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
Kyles' due process rights were violated by the prosecution's failure to
disclose evidence.' 8 7
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In an opinion written by Justice Souter, 88 the Supreme Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision and granted a new trial for Curtis
177 Id. at 817.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 820 (King, J., dissenting).
181 Id. (King, J., dissenting).
182 Id. (KingJ., dissenting).
183 Id. at 832 (King, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (King, J, dissenting).
185 Id. (King, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 840 (King, J., dissenting).
187 Kyles v. Whitey, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1556 (1995).
188 Justices O'Connor, Stevens, Ginsburg and BreyerjoinedJustice Souter's opinion.
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Kyles. 189 Relying on Brady v. Maryland'9 0 and United States v. Bagley,19 1
Justice Souter found there was a "reasonable probability" that the evi-
dence withheld by the prosecution would have caused the jury to
reach a different decision. 192 Therefore, Justice Souter found the evi-
dence material and a new trial necessary.
193
As a threshold matter, Justice Souter addressed why the Court of
Appeals' decision was subject to review.194 Relying on Burger v.
Kemp,19 5 Justice Souter stated that the Court's duty to search for con-
stitutional error with painstaking care is never more exacting than in a
capital case.' 9 6 Therefore, the Court concluded, there was reason to
question whether the Court of Appeals evaluated the significance of
the undisclosed evidence under the correct standard.
19 7
Justice Souter then identified the correct standard for cases in
which the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. Rely-
ing on United States v. Bagley,198 the Court declared that evidence
favorable to the defendant is material, and constitutional error results
from its suppression by the government "if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."' 99
According to Justice Souter, four aspects of materiality require
emphasis under Bagley.20 0 First, Justice Souter explained that a show-
ing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance
that disclosure of suppressed evidence would have resulted in the de-
fendant's acquittal.20 1 Rather, Justice Souter stressed, the touchstone
of materiality is a "reasonable probability" of a trial in which the ver-
dict is undermined.
20 2
Second, Justice Souter argued that a determination of materiality
is not a sufficiency of evidence test.2 03 One does not show a Brady
violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence
189 Id.
190 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
191 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
192 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1569.
193 Id. at 1575.
194 Id. at 1560.
195 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (holding petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
invalid).
196 Kyes, 115 S. Ct. at 1560 (1995) (quoting Burger, 483 U.S. at 785).
197 Id.
198 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
199 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1565 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Black-
mun, J.), 685 (opinion of White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
200 Id
201 Id. at 1565-66.




would have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence
could "reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different
light as to undermine confidence in the verdict."
20 4
Third, Justice Souter stated that, contrary to the Court of Ap-
peals' assumption, once a reviewing court applying Bagley has found
constitutional error, there is no need for further harmless error re-
view because the constitutional standard for materiality under Bagley
imposes a higher burden than the harmless error standard of Brecht v.
Abrahamson.
205
Fourth, Justice Souter stressed that the state's disclosure obliga-
tion turns on the cumulative effect of all suppressed evidence
favorable to the defense, not on the evidence considered item-by-
item.206 The Court explained that it is the prosecutor's duty to evalu-
ate the evidence in sum and determine whether a "reasonable
probability" has been generated.20 7 Justice Souter concluded his Bag-
ley discussion by declaring that the Court of Appeals had wrongly eval-
uated the evidence as a series of individual materiality evaluations,
rather than the cumulative evaluation Bagley requires.
208
In the next section of the opinion, Justice Souter explained how
disclosure of the withheld evidence would have made a different re-
sult in Kyles' trial reasonably probable. 20 9 First, Justice Souter com-
pared two accounts offered by eyewitnesses at trial with the
undisclosed contemporaneous statements they gave to police right af-
ter the crime occurred.210 Henry Williams' contemporaneous state-
ment described Kyles as more than five inches shorter than his actual
height and much thinner than his actual build.21' Isaac Smallwood
said in his statement that he did not see the murder or the assailant
outside the vehicle, yet Justice Souter pointed out that at trial
Smallwood testified he saw the .32 caliber weapon when Kyles strug-
gled with Dye outside the car and that he saw the actual shooting.
21 2
Second, Souter addressed the undisclosed conversations and
statements regarding Beanie.21 3 Justice Souter alleged Beanie's state-
204 Id.
205 Id. The Court explained that a Bagey error could not be treated as harmless because
the "reasonable probability" standard put forth in Bagley necessarily entails the conclusion
that the suppression must have had "substantial injurious effect or influence in determin-
ing ajury's verdict." Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1712 (1993)).
206 Id. at 1567.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 1569.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 1569-71.
211 Id. at 1569.
212 Id. at 1570.
213 Id. at 1571-73. Examples of the inconsistencies included the varying days Beanie told
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ments were fraught with inconsistencies which the defense could have
used to challenge the thoroughness of the police investigation.
214
Third, the opinion discussed the undisclosed list of license plates
police recorded after the murder.2 15 The release of this information,
claimed Justice Souter, would have undermined the prosecutions' use
of a photograph to establish that Kyles' car was at the scene of the
murder when it was committed.21 6 Finally, Justice Souter concluded
that the newly discovered evidence made the prosecution's case much
weaker while drastically increasing the persuasiveness of defense argu-
ments.2 17 As a result, he held there was a "reasonable probability" that
the earlier jury decision had been undermined and that a new trial
should be granted.2
18
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens 219 offered three reasons why
the case was given "favored treatment" over other death penalty cases
in determining a grant of certiorari. 220 First, Justice Stevens claimed
that a hung jury in the first trial provided strong reason to believe the
significant errors that occurred at the second trial were prejudicial.221
Second, cases in which the record reveals so many instances in which
the state failed to disclose exculpatory evidence are extremely rare. 222
Third, Justice Stevens' independent review of the case left him with
serious doubts as to the defendant's guilt.2 2 3 As a result of these three
factors, Justice Stevens stated that "[the Court's] duty to administer
justice occasionally requires busy judges to engage in a detailed review
of the particular facts of a case, even though [the Court's] labors may
not provide posterity with a newly minted rule of law." 224
the police he bought the car and Kevin Black's involvement in retrieving the car and trans-
ferring the groceries. Id. at 1571. Justice Souter believed that these inconsistencies, when
added to Beanie's suggestion to look in Kyles' garbage for the handbag and his knowledge
of where Kyles' car was parked during the murder, amounted to a powerful defense. Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 157--74.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 1574-75.
218 Id. at 1575-76.
219 Justice Ginsberg andJustice BreyerjoinedJustice Stevens' opinion.
220 Id. at 1576 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Id. at 1577 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
221 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
222 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
223 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
224 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT
Justice Scalia,225 writing in dissent, concluded that the Court
should not have granted certiorari to the petitioner, nor should the
Court have reversed the decisions of the lower courts.2 26 Justice Scalia
admonished the Court for granting certiorari, reasoning that it was
wholly unprecedented to consider a fact-bound claim of error re-
jected by every state and federal court that had previously heard it.227
Relying on United States v. Johnson,228 Justice Scalia argued that it was
the Court's policy to deny a claim by a petitioner that a correct view of
the law was incorrectly applied to the facts.2 29 Furthermore, Justice
Scalia argued that the Court has, in the past, applied the "two court"
rule with particular vigor and deferred to lower courts when both the
district and circuit courts agreed on what factual conclusion the rec-
ord required, as in this case. 23 0 Finally, Justice Scalia pointed out that
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Court was required to defer to lower
court findings of fact when reviewing habeas corpus petitions.
2 31
Thus,Justice Scalia argued certiorari should not have been granted in
the Kyles case.
Justice Scalia also questioned the majority's assertion that review
was warranted by a legal error made by the Court of Appeals.23 2 Jus-
tice Scalia argued that the Court of Appeals applied the same materi-
ality standard the majority used in its opinion.23 3 Moreover, Justice
Scalia asserted that the Court of Appeals applied the Brady standard
correctly because it evaluated the evidence's impact as a whole, unlike
the majority, which he argued made several individual findings of
materiality.
23 4
Next, Justice Scalia proclaimed that the Court "having improvi-
dently decided to review the facts of the case, went on to get the facts
wrong."235 In particular, Justice Scalia argued that the potential effect
of the Brady material on the eyewitness testimony was immaterial.23
6
Justice Scalia reasoned that even with the introduction of the Brady
225 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, andJustice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia's
opinion.
226 Id. at 1576 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925).
229 Kyes, 115 S. Ct. at 1577 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
230 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231 IM. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234 Id. at 1578 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
236 Id. at 1579 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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evidence, the testimony of two witnesses remained unaffected.237
Contemporaneous statements did not compromise the testimony of
Robert Territo, who witnessed Kyles commit the murder and saw Kyles
at close range, or Darlene Cahill, who saw Kyles commit the murder
from 100 feet away.23 8 As for Isaac Smallwood, Justice Scalia argued
that his testimony was "barely affected" by the introduction of the con-
temporaneous police statements. 239 Justice Scalia noted that although
Smallwood may not have seen the defendant outside of the LTD, he
did see Kyles' face at close range, thereby making him an effective
witness.240 Justice Scalia did admit that Henry Williams' testimony was
somewhat impaired because his description of the gunman in the un-
disclosed contemporaneous statement did not match Kyles.
24 '
However, Justice Scalia went on to say that he was concerned with
the majority's proposition that the effective impeachment of one wit-
ness can call for a new trial even though the attack did not extend
directly to others.242 Justice Scalia argued that the majority's position
assumed an irrational jury and was incompatible with the whole idea
of a materiality standard, which presumes incriminating evidence that
would have been impeached by proper disclosure can be logically sep-
arated from incriminating evidence that remains unaffected.243
Finally, Justice Scalia addressed the strength of the physical evi-
dence against Kyles. 244 Specifically, the dissent stressed the impor-
tance of the cat food found in Kyles' home.245 Prior to her murder,
Dye had been doing her weekly grocery shopping which included buy-
ing pet food for her two cats and her dog.24 6 Thus, Justice Scalia al-
leged, finding fifteen cans of pet food similar to the type normally
purchased by Dye was strong proof that Kyles committed the mur-
der.247 Justice Scalia went on to point out that when the defendant
was questioned at trial about the cat food, he testified that he bought
a great deal of it because it was on sale.248 However, the prosecution.
presented witnesses from the store that testified the pet food was not
on sale as Kyles claimed.249 Justice Scalia concluded that the State
237 Id. at 1582 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238 Id. at 1580, 1582 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
239 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
240 Id. at 1581 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241 Id. at 1581 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
242 Id. at 1582-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 1583 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
244 Id. at 1583-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245 Id. at 1584 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
247 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248 Id. at 1585 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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presented a "massive core" of evidence showing the petitioner was
guilty of murder, and that he lied about his guilt.25 0 Justice Scalia
concluded that the Brady evidence only immaterially affected the
"core" of evidence, and therefore did not warrant a new trial for the
petitioner or a lesser sentence.
25'
V. ANALYSIS
This Note addresses the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in
Kyles v. Whitley. This Note argues that the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in Kyles v. Whitley to review whether an innocent man was sen-
tenced to death, but "strained" to find a legal error in order to justify
certiorari. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's use of an illusory legal
error created confusion over the proper application of the "material-
ity" standard. To have avoided potential confusion, the Court should
have justified certiorari consistent with its true concerns over the kill-
ing of a potentially innocent man.
This Note also addresses the dissent's use of the "two court rule"
and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to argue that certiorari should have been
denied. The dissent misapplied the "two court rule" and § 2254 in its
argument that the Supreme Court should not have granted certiorari
in Kyles v. Whitley. Moreover, the dissent's use of the "two court rule"
and § 2254 will further confuse an already present circuit court split
over the proper standard of review in Brady cases.
A. THE COURT'S GRANT OF CERTIORARI
1. The Supreme Court Granted Certiorari to Review Whether an Innocent
Man Had Been Sentenced to Death
The Supreme Court's true concern in granting certiorari was that
the lower courts had sentenced the wrong man to death, not that they
had used the wrong legal standard of "materiality." This is best evi-
denced by the Court's own statements. Justice Souter first implied
that the severity of the death penalty was the reason the Court granted
certiorari when he stated that the Court's "duty to search for constitu-
tional error with painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a
capital case."252 Moreover, the majority went on to emphasize in its
description of the case history that Justice King, in his circuit court
dissent, stated "for the first time in my fourteen years on this court...
I have serious reservations about whether the State has sentenced to
250 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
252 115 S. Ct. at 1560 (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987)).
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death the right man."253
The most telling evidence of the Court's sentiments is Justice Ste-
vens' short concurrence. In an attempt to justify certiorari beyond the
"strained" legal error found by the Court, Justice Stevens reiterated
Justice King's sentiments in his concurring opinion. "Despite my high
regard for the diligence and craftsmanship of the author of the major-
ity opinion in the Court of Appeals, my independent review of the
case left me with the same degree of doubt about petitioner's guilt
expressed by the dissenting judge in that court."254 As a result of such
doubt, Justice Stevens concluded it was the Court's duty to consider a
case like Kyles'.
2 5 5
The Court's real desire to consider whether an innocent man was
wrongly sentenced to death is also evidenced by its "strained"256 at-
tempt to find legal error. First, after claiming the Fifth Circuit used
the wrong "materiality" standard, the Court went on to use the same
"materiality" standard as the Fifth Circuit and to mimic the circuit
court's application of the standard. The Supreme Court, in United
States v. Bagley, reformulated the "materiality" standard originally used
in United States v. Agurs.257 Under Bagley the standard for determining
the "materiality" of undisclosed evidence was no longer whether the
"evidence would create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial
judge," but whether there was a reasonable probability the jury's deci-
sion would be undermined by the new evidence.2 58
While the majority did emphasize four aspects of materiality
under Bagley,2 59 it mimicked the court of appeals' ultimate reliance on
253 Id. at 1564 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.Sd 806, 820 (1993) (King, J., dissenting)).
254 Id. at 1576. WhileJustice Stevens acknowledged a legal issue in this case, he went on
to justify certiorari on three grounds. One of the grounds was his concern that the death
penalty had been given to an innocent man. He also justified certiorari by pointing to the
hung jury in Kyes' first trial and by the number of instances the prosecution did not dis-
close evidence. Id.
255 Id. "Our duty to administer justice occasionally requires busy judges to engage in a
detailed review of the particular facts of the case, even though our labors may not provide
posterity with a newly minted rule of law." Ret
256 The dissent argued that "[s]training to suggest a legal error in the decision below
that might warrant review, the Court asserts that '[t]here is room to debate whether the
two judges in the majority in the Court of Appeals made an assessment of the cumulative
effect of the evidence.'" Id. at 1577 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1561).
257 See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
258 Compare United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.)
("[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the out-
come.") with United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (constitutional error exists
when "the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist").
259 The four aspects of materiality emphasized by the court were that: (1) a showing of
materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the sup-
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the Bagley touchstone of materiality-"a reasonable probability" of a
different result.26 0 Moreover, the Kyles decision did nothing to quell
the general complaints regarding the Bagley standard of "materiality"
or to remedy its shortcomings.2 61 Thus, while Kyles could be said to
reaffirm the Bagley standard of "materiality" it certainly could not be
said to change the standard in any way that justified certiorari.
Second, in reviewing the court of appeals' opinion, the Court in-
correctly concluded that, "[t]here is room to debate whether the two
judges in the majority in the Court of Appeals made an assessment of
the cumulative effect of the evidence."262 To the contrary, the circuit
court majority applied the "materiality" standard exactly as it was set
forth by the Supreme Court in Bagley.
Under the Bagley materiality standard, courts must evaluate sup-
pressed evidence collectively, not item by item, when determining its
effect on ajury verdict.2 63 However, only after the court has evaluated
the "tendency and force"264 of the evidence item by item can the col-
lective effect of the evidence then be separately evaluated for the pur-
pressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal; (2) the Bagey
standard of materiality is not a sufficiency of evidence test; (3) once a reviewing court
applying Bagley has found constitutional error there is no need for further harmless-error
review, and (4) the Bag&y standard of materiality requires the impact of suppressed evi-
dence on the jury's verdict to be evaluated collectively, not item-by-item. Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at
1566-67. Some may argue that the Court's attempt to itemize the application of the Bag/ey
rule is a step towards using bright line rules instead of speculation over the impact sup-
pressed evidence will have on jury verdicts. However, the Court's emphasis on the four
aspects of materiality were not new to the Kyles case. Rather, the aspects espoused by the
Court were already in jurisprudence as indicated by their cites to previous cases emphasiz-
ing the aspect.
260 Conpare Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 811 (1993) ("We apply the Bagley standard here
by examining whether it is reasonably probable that, had the undisclosed information
been available to Kyles, the result would have been different.") with Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.
Ct. 1555, 1569 (1995) ("In this case, disclosure of the suppressed evidence to competent
counsel would have made a different result reasonably probable.").
261 Terrence J. Galligan, Comment, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
After United States v. Bagley, 1 GEo.J. LEoAL ETmics 213, 225-31 (1987). The Bagley stan-
dard has been criticized on both theoretical and practical grounds. The standard is at-
tacked as theoretically flawed because instead of using a fairness inquiry, as Brady originally
intended, the Court in Bagley moved to a resuh-oriented approach. Id. at 225. Critics
assert that this potentially countenances what would otherwise be gross constitutional er-
ror, if the reviewing court feels that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial. Id.
Critics also contend that the standard does not give practical guidance to prosecutors, who
must speculate ex ante about the effect a piece of evidence will have on ajury. Id. at 227.
Moreover, critics argue that the standard is impractical forjudges to apply, because ajudge
must speculate on the impact of evidence from a cold record. Id.
262 Kiles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1569 (1995).
263 Id. at 1567.




pose of determining materiality.2 65 Although the circuit court spent
considerable time determining the "tendency and force" of each
piece of evidence, it declared several times that for the purposes of
determining materiality the pieces of evidence were not evaluated in-
dependently, as the Supreme Court suggested, but collectively, as Bag-
ley requires.266
The Supreme Court performed the same application of the Bagley
standard when it evaluated the undisclosed evidence. 267 First, it evalu-
ated the evidence item by item.268 Only after the individual evalua-
tion of each piece of evidence did the Supreme Court then decide the
collective effect of the evidence. 269 Thus, because the Supreme Court
employed the same standard and the same approach as the court of
appeals, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court truly found error in the
Fifth Circuit's application of Bagley.
2. The Court Created Legal Error to Justify Certiorari
The Court's primary role in the American judicial system is to
hear cases whose resolution can be expected to provide useful gui-
dance to lower courts confronted with similar issues.2 70 As a result,
any obligation to do justice in an individual case is secondary to the
Court's role as expositor of constitutional and federal law.2 71 Thus,
certiorari is generally justified when it is granted to clarify law con-
fused by lower courts, but not when it is granted to hear individual
claims of injustice.272
Undoubtedly, the majority recognized that granting certiorari to
review the guilt or innocence of Kyles would have fallen outside this
265 Id.
266 See Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 807 (1993) (basing its rejection of petitioner's claim
on "a complete reading of the record"); id. at 811 ("Rather than reviewing the alleged
Brady materials in the abstract, we will examine the evidence presented at trial and how the
extra materials would have fit."); id. at 817 ("We are not persuaded that it is reasonably
probable that the jury would have found in Kyles' favor if exposed to any or all of the
undisclosed materials.").
267 The Supreme Court admitted so much in foomote 10: "We evaluate the tendency
and force of the undisclosed evidence item by item; there is no other way." Kyles, 115 U.S.
at 1567 n.10.
268 Id. at 1569-75.
269 Id. at 1575 ("Confidence that Ijury verdict would have been the same] cannot survive
a recap of the suppressed evidence and its significance for the prosecution.").
270 Condemned, supra note 8, at 1135.
271 Id.
272 The dissent argues that the Court has generally adhered to the policy that when a
petitioner claims that a concededly correct view of the law was incorrectly applied to the
facts, certiorari is normally denied. Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1576 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925)).
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normal judicial function.273 The Court, therefore, found that the
court of appeals made a legal mistake that needed clarification.
274
This allowed the Court to justify certiorari under its normal institu-
tional role.2 75 Thus, by finding legal error the Court attempted to
avoid any implication that it was reviewing all death penalty cases for
legal and factual errors, a role it was not designed to perform.276 At
the same time, the Court was able to address its true concern over
Kyles' actual guilt.
3. The Court's Use of an illusory Legal Error Will Confuse Lower Courts
in the Future
As a result of using lower court error as justification for certiorari
rather than its true concern over Kyles' guilt, the Court has confused
the application of the Bagley materiality standard for future courts.
When using the Bagley standard, virtually all circuit courts evaluate the
"force" of evidence individually before making a collective determina-
tion of whether the evidence is material. 277 By criticizing this ap-
proach yet employing the approach itself, the Supreme Court has left
the circuit courts with no direction on how to correctly apply the stan-
dard. Rather, the circuit courts can only continue to apply the stan-
dard as they have without the reassurance that the application will be
upheld on appeal.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's attempt to find legal error in
the lower court could create even more drastic results. Circuit courts,
now under the understanding that individual analysis is wrong, may
abandon the important job of evaluating the individual evidence's
"force" altogether.278 Instead of reviewing the individual impact of the
273 By granting certiorari simply to review Kyles because it was a death penalty case the
Court would have given the impression that they were functioning as a court of errors and
appeals searching the record in every death penalty case for potential injustice. See id. at
1577 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
274 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1569.
275 Certiorari was justified under the Court's institutional role because it appeared that
the Supreme Court was going to give lower courts guidance on how to use the Bagey "ma-
teriality" standard.
276 While the Court attempted to avoid questions about its grant for certiorari, it is obvi-
ous from the dissent's scathing opinion that certiorari was at the least questionable and
more likely not justified at all.
277 See, e.g., United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1459-61 (9th Cir. 1995).
278 Determining the "tendency and force" of the evidence individually is important be-
cause it makes the court think about whether the evidence will actually have any impact.
For example, in Kyles the withheld material included the contemporaneous statements of
the eyewitnesses and Beanie's statements to police. Individual evaluation, before the col-
lective evaluation, required the court to identify and explain how the contemporaneous
statements affected the testimony in court and how Beanie's contradictory statements
could have affected the plausibility of the defendant's defense. Only after thinking
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evidence, which offers justification for a court's ultimate finding of
the evidence's collective impact, a court can now simply make unsup-
ported, conclusory decisions about the evidence's collective impact.2 79
This conclusory approach would hardly insure an intelligent decision
of whether evidence withheld by the prosecution would undermine
the jury's verdict, yet it could be upheld under the Supreme Court's
confusing decision in Kyles v. Whitley.
4. The Court Should Have Justified Certiorari in a Way That Was
Consistent With its True Concerns Over the Death Penalty
To avoid the confusion created by an illusory legal error, the
Court should have justified certiorari consistent with its true concern
over the death penalty. Although the Supreme Court's grant of certi-
orari to review Kyles' possible innocence would have exceeded the
bounds of its traditional institutional role,280 it would have been ap-
propriate2 1 because: (1) it would have been within the Court's consti-
tutional power; (2) it would have been consistent with the Court's
increased scrutiny in death penalty cases; and (3) it would have had
limited implications for the Court's disposition towards future death
penalty cases.
First, the Supreme Court's constitutional authority justified hear-
ing Kyles' case. Article III of the Constitution grants the Supreme
Court the authority to decide all cases or controversies within its juris-
diction.28 2 It is within the Court's jurisdiction to hear any case involv-
ing a constitutional issue.283 The prosecution's suppression of
evidence in this case was a violation of the defendant's due process
through the smaller pieces of evidence item by item and evaluating their effect, can courts
decide whether the combined impact of all of the withheld evidence undermines a jury's
verdict.
279 By citing the boilerplate language in Kyles that the only necessary determination is
the collective impact of the evidence, courts now have the ability to conclude that evidence
taken collectively has an impact without having to justify their determinations by showing
how the evidence specifically affects previous trial testimony, arguments, etc. The danger
of allowing courts to make conclusory decisions withoutjustification is that the courts may
more easily exercise their biases when making their decisions.
280 It would have exceeded the bounds of its normal institutional role because the Court
would not have purported to create any new "generalizable" principle of law.
281 This position is consistent with Justice Stevens' concurrence. In concurrence justice
Stevens states, "I wish such review [of guilt or innocence] were unnecessary, but I cannot
agree that our position in the judicial hierarchy makes it inappropriate." Kyles v. Whitley,
115 S. Ct. 1555, 1576 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring). While this Note argues that certio-
rari to review Kyles' guilt was appropriate in this case, some authors have promoted models
that would give all death penalty cases special attention in the selection process. See e.g.,
Condemned, supra note 8, at 1142-48.
282 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
283 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-80 (1803).
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right to a fair trial.2 84 Thus, because the issue in the Kyles case was
constitutional in nature, it would have been within the Supreme
Court's power to grant certiorari.
285
Second, the grant of certiorari would have been appropriate be-
cause the Supreme Court accords a higher degree of scrutiny to the
review of death penalty cases.2 86 The Court has long held that "[t] he
qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny" in death penalty cases.2 87
As a result, the Court has required that cases like Kyles "be policed at
all stages by an especially vigilant concern for procedural fairness and
for the accuracy of fact-finding."28
8
In light of Kyles' ambiguous facts, it would have been consistent
with the Supreme Court's use of heightened scrutiny in death penalty
cases to grant certiorari. As Justice Stevens correctly argues, " [o]ur
duty to administer justice occasionally requires busy judges to engage
in a detailed review of the particular facts of a case, even though our
labors may not provide posterity with a newly minted rule of law."28 9
Finally, the grant of certiorari would not have greatly affected the
Court's policy for granting certiorari in future death penalty cases.
While granting certiorari to review guilt may have given the impres-
sion that the Court was willing to search for legal and factual errors in
every death penalty case, the Court in reality could never serve such a
function.2 9
0
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia himself makes it abun-
dantly clear that "[s]ince the majority is as aware of the limits of our
capacity as I am, there is little fear that the grant of certiorari in a case
284 Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1575 (1995).
285 Because it is the Court's historical role to protect individual liberties it might even be
said that the Court not only had the constitutional power to review Kyles v. Witly to make
sure Kyles received a fair trial, but that it was also the Court's duty. See, e.g., FederalJudicial
Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, reprinted in 57 F.R.D.
573, 578 (1972) (essential functions of the Court include definition and vindication of
rights guaranteed by Constitution, assuring uniformity of federal law, and maintaining con-
stitutional distribution of powers in a federal union); JEssE H. CHOPER, JUDICAL REviEw
AND THE NATIONAL PoLrnCmL PROCESS 60-128 (1980) (Court's essential role is protection of
individual liberties).
286 See generally Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
287 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983).
288 Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 263 (1988) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
concurring in thejudgment) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704 (1984)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Justice Scalia's argument that
the Supreme Court should defer to lower court decisions ignores this proposition. If the
Supreme Court deferred to lower courts, meaningful appeal would never take place in
death penalty cases as it should.
289 Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1576 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
290 Condemned, supra note 8, at 1135.
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of this sort will often be repeated-which is to say little fear that to-
day's grant has any generalizable principle behind it."291 Simply put,
searching every record in death penalty cases for legal and factual er-
rors, like the Court did in Kyles, would put catastrophic demands on
the Court's workload that could not be met 29 2 Thus, it is unlikely the
Court's grant of certiorari to review the death of a potentially inno-
cent man would have changed its institutional role.
B. THE DISSENT'S USE OF THE "TWO COURT RULE" AND § 2254
1. The Dissent Improperly Used the "Two Court Rule" and 28 U.S. C.
§ 2254(d) to Argue Certiorari Should Have Been Denied
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the "two court rule" and 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) precluded the Supreme Court from hearing Kyles v.
Whitley.2 9s The "two court rule" requires that a reviewing court defer
to lower court findings of fact when two consecutive courts find the
same way.29 4 Similarly, § 2254(d) requires that a reviewing court de-
fer to lower court findings of fact in habeas corpus petitions.2 95 The
dissent reasoned that the "materiality" determination was fact-based
and, thus, under the "two court rule" and § 2254(d) the Supreme
Court was required to defer to lower court decisions.2 96 Because all of
the lower courts found that a Brady violation had not occurred, the
dissent argued that the Supreme Court was barred from granting cer-
tiorari to review their decisions.297
However, the dissent's suggestion that "materiality" determina-
tions are an exercise in fact-finding ignores Supreme Court prece-
dent. Bagley's formulation of the materiality standard was derived
from Strickland v. Washington.298 In Strickland, the Court held that the
same inquiry in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim presented a mixed question of law and fact.2 99 Because Bagley
borrowed the "reasonable probability" standard from Strickland, the
review of whether evidence is "material" should not require deference
to lower courts under the "two court rule" or § 2254(d) because it is
not a finding of fact, but a mixed issue of fact and law.
300
291 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1578.
292 Condemned supra note 8, at 1135.
293 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1577.
294 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
295 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
296 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1577.
297 Id.
298 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)
(adopting the Strickland definition of materiality).
299 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
300 See Wilson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d at 438 n.6. In Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597
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2. The Dissent Exacerbated a Circuit Court Split Over the Proper Standard
of Review for Brady/Bagley Violations
By suggesting "materiality" determinations are an exercise in fact-
finding, the dissent further confused the proper standard of review
for Bagley violations. Currently, the courts of appeals are split over the
proper standard of review for "materiality" determinations. While a
few of the circuit courts have found "materiality" determinations to be
an exercise in fact-finding that require deference to lower courts
under a "clearly erroneous" standard,3 01 the majority of circuit courts
consider "materiality" determinations a mixed issue of law and fact
that require de novo review.3 0
2
The dissent's suggestion that materiality determinations are a
finding of fact adds confusion to the circuit court split because it di-
rectly contradicts Supreme Court precedent that suggests materiality
determinations are a mixed question of fact and law.303 This ambigu-
ity over the correct standard of review is only compounded by the
majority's decision not to address this issue. Rather, the majority's
finding that a legal error occurred, automatically required de novo re-
view without the need for explaining what the appropriate standard
should be when there is no legal error, but a mixed question of law
and fact. Thus, in the absence of a definitive Supreme Court standard
of review for Brady violations, it is likely the circuit courts will remain
split over the subject.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court did in Kyles v. Whitley what the lower courts
hearing the case should have done long before-remanded the case
to ajury for a determination of whether Kyles actually committed the
murder. Only a jury's evaluation of the new evidence and the de-
meanor of the witnesses could ensure an accurate conclusion in the
Kyles case. Unfortunately, to reach the correct result, the Court had to
create an illusory legal error out of whole cloth. By doing so, the
Court not only confused lower court application of the "materiality"
standard, but, more importantly, missed a golden opportunity to ex-
press to the general public that it is concerned about the wrongful
imposition of the death penalty.
Ty HOWTON
(1982), the Court explicitly refused to give deference to lower court findings under
§ 2254(d) when the issue was a mixed question of law and fact rather than a pure finding
of fact. As a mixed question of law and fact, the standard of review traditionally has been
de novo. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 642 (Stevens, J., concurring).
301 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
302 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
303 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
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